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Abstract—In this paper we consider authentication at the
physical layer, in which the authenticator aims at distinguishing
a legitimate supplicant from an attacker on the basis of the
characteristics of the communication channel. Authentication is
performed over a set of parallel wireless channels affected by
time-varying fading at the presence of a malicious attacker,
whose channel has a spatial correlation with the supplicant’s
one. We first propose the use of two different statistical decision
methods, and we prove that using a large number of references
(in the form of channel estimates) affected by different levels
of time-varying fading is not beneficial from a security point
of view. We then propose to exploit classification methods
based on machine learning. In order to face the worst case
of an authenticator provided with no forged messages during
training, we consider one-class classifiers. When instead the
training set includes some forged messages, we resort to more
conventional binary classifiers, considering the cases in which
such messages are either labelled or not. For the latter case,
we exploit clustering algorithms to label the training set. The
performance of both nearest neighbor (NN) and support vector
machine (SVM) classification techniques is assessed. Through
numerical examples, we show that under the same probability
of false alarm, one-class classification (OCC) algorithms achieve
the lowest probability of missed detection when a small spatial
correlation exists between the main channel and the adversary
one, while statistical methods are advantageous when the spatial
correlation between the two channels is large.
Index Terms—Clustering, machine learning, physical layer
authentication, wireless communications.
I. INTRODUCTION
Classical authentication protocols rely on cryptographic
primitives to allow the supplicant to prove his identity to the
authenticator. Although such approaches are well consolidated
and already implemented in real world applications, they
may exhibit some limitations when adopted in new scenarios,
like that of the Internet of Things (IoT). In fact, crypto-
graphic approaches are usually characterized by a relatively
large complexity, since security relies on the difficulty for a
computationally-constrained attacker to break some mathemat-
ical trapdoor.
In IoT applications, huge numbers of resource-constrained
cyber-physical devices are deployed, and they need to be
authenticated in order to avoid impersonation and falsification
attacks. In such a context, the use of classic authentication
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protocols based on cryptographic primitives may result cum-
bersome, due to computing power and memory constraints of
embedded devices. Opposed to approaches based on crypto-
graphic primitives, physical layer security (PLS) approaches
exhibit some features that make them particularly suitable for
IoT applications, that is:
• they do not require any assumption on the computing
power of attackers;
• they only rely on the communication channel’s charac-
teristics and do not need pre-shared credentials;
• they are characterized by low complexity.
For this reason, a recent trend in the literature is focused on
PLS solutions for IoT applications [1], [2], [3], [4]. Low-
complexity security frameworks for key generation based on
PLS have also been proposed [5], together with solutions that
consider adversaries having infinite computational capabilities
[6] over realistic wireless channels [7].
Authentication is one of the first and most important tasks
in secure communications. It aims at recognizing messages
coming from a legitimate supplicant while detecting those
which may be forged by a malicious attacker. At the physical
layer, authentication is performed by distinguishing the source
of a message based on the unique characteristics of the
communication channel [8].
In this paper, we consider and design some physical layer
authentication (PLA) protocols based on several decision cri-
teria, both based on statistical hypothesis testing and machine
learning approaches. We consider wireless parallel channels
affected by time-varying fading to assess the performance
of the PLA protocols we examine. The legitimate receiver
does not know the exact realizations of the channel between
the transmitter and itself, but he may know some of its
statistical properties, such as the noise variance, or even not
have any channel state information (CSI). In the latter case,
authentication must hence be performed blindly with respect
to the channel characteristics. Concerning decision methods,
we start from the statistical techniques used in [9] for a flat
fading wireless channel model, and consider several others
decision criteria. We also start from statistical criteria based
on a hypothesis testing approach [10], and their corresponding
optimal attacks. Then we consider decision criteria based
on machine learning, whose application to PLA has started
to attract interest in the literature in the last years under
different scenarios [11], [12]. For this purpose, we consider
several classification methods based on machine learning, and
compare the performance they achieve with that obtainable
through classical statistical methods. In particular, we use
2nearest neighbor (NN) and support vector machine (SVM)
algorithms, examining both their binary and one-class ver-
sions. The former have a low computational complexity with a
reduced training set, which makes them attractive in resource-
constrained applications, while the latter allow avoiding the
search of optimal parameters in the initial phase. We perform
the training phase considering both the case of an authenticator
who knows exactly the source of the received setup packets
and that of an uninformed authenticator. We therefore also
consider clustering algorithms to establish the identity of the
message sender during the initial phase.
A. Related work
Blind authentication schemes have been proposed in the last
years, as in [13], where techniques of blind known-interference
cancellation and differential processing are combined to imple-
ment authentication, but they rely on the sharing of a secret key
between legitimate participants. Effects of time-varying fading
have been studied in literature considering schemes based both
on the sharing of a secret key [13] and key-less approaches
[14], [15].
To the best of our knowledge, machine learning has been ap-
plied to PLA only very recently and under different conditions,
for instance not considering time-varying fading channels (see
[16], [12]). In [17], k-NN algorithms are used to identify elec-
tronic devices through their radio-frequency emissions, and the
presence of an attacker is not explicitly considered. Authors of
[18] propose the application of an adaptive algorithm for PLA
in a dynamically changing wireless environment, considering a
single channel model and a series of physical layer attributes
which may include CSI. In [19], instead, machine-learning-
aided intelligent authentication techniques are proposed for
5G communications.
B. Contribution
We consider a training phase corresponding only to the
initial state of the channel, which is the same assumed by the
statistical techniques, and the existence of some correlation
between the main channel and the adversary’s one. This
models a more realistic training phase with respect to [18].
Moreover, differently from [18], we also consider the use
of non-supervised techniques to discriminate authentic from
forged messages during the training phase, letting a clustering
algorithm to decide about the nature of the received packets.
We show that even in such an unfavorable condition it is
possible to achieve good security performance using machine
learning algorithms, especially when the attacker’s channel has
a low spatial correlation with the main one.
Starting from the previous works [20], [21], we consolidate
and extend the analysis by:
• considering the more general case in which fading also
affects the training phase;
• exploiting clustering algorithms to establish the source of
a message during the initial phase, in order to avoid the
use of higher layer cryptographic protocols;
• comparing different machine learning techniques based
on different classification principles, also considering
their binary and one-class versions.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II we introduce
the authentication protocol and the channel model considered,
along with the relevant performance metrics. In Section III two
different decision methods based on statistical techniques are
introduced. Section IV describes the attacker models, while
Section V describes the one-class classification algorithms
we apply. Numerical evaluations and the relevant results are
reported in Section VI, after which Section VII provides some
conclusive remarks.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND METRICS
We consider the channel model depicted in Figure 1, where
a peer (Alice) has to be authenticated by an authenticator (Bob)
at the presence of a malicious attacker (Eve), who aims at
impersonating Alice by forging her messages. Through PLA,
Bob should be able to recognize the messages coming from
Alice as legitimate and to refuse the ones coming from Eve.
Alice Bob
Eve
Fig. 1. Physical layer authentication channel model.
Transmission of a message is performed over a set of N
parallel channels, which can model multi-carrier or orthog-
onal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) transmission.
Each channel is corrupted by additive white Gaussian noise
(AWGN) and affected by time-varying fading. The rapidity
of channel variations clearly influences the quality of authen-
tication, since it makes more difficult for Bob to recognize
channel estimates coming from the same source.
Channel samples representing the channel impulse response
(CIR) are collected into a vector h of complex numbers, whose
entries are zero-mean correlated circularly symmetric complex
Gaussian variables. Each channel estimate is then written as
h(XY) ∼ CN (0N×1,R(XY)), (1)
where X and Y represent a general couple of transmitter and
receiver, respectively, and CN (0,R) denotes the distribution
of circularly symmetric complex Gaussian random vectors
(with zero mean) having covariance matrix R.
3The authentication procedure we consider is based only
on channel estimates, and does not require additional cryp-
tographic mechanisms. In general, an authentication protocol
comprises two phases, that are summarized next.
a) Phase I (training): In the training phase, Bob observes
one or more packets with known content transmitted from
Alice during a fixed interval of time. The source of the
messages can be guaranteed either by exploiting higher layer
protocols or through physical measures (e.g., by manually
executing the setup phase). By exploiting these setup packets,
Bob obtains a set of M time-correlated channel estimates
which, depending on the duration of the time interval, may
be subject to time-varying fading. The m-th estimate can be
written as
hˆ(AB)(m) = α(I)(m)h(AB)+
√
1− α(I)2(m)w(m)+w(I)(m),
(2)
where w(I) ∼ CN (0N×1, σ2I IN ) is a noise vector. The contri-
bution of time-varying fading is represented by a [1×N ] vector
α, whose elements correspond to real numbers taking values
in [0, 1], and by a random variable w generated according
to a Rayleigh distribution with unitary variance. We work
under the hypothesis of slowly time-varying fading channels,
meaning that the fading coefficient is assumed constant during
transmission of each packet [22].
If during Phase I Bob collects M > 1 reference estimates,
he can average over them in order to reduce the noise level and
to obtain the average value of the fading parameter α(I) , which
may vary from one estimate to another. Hence he obtains the
average estimate
h¯(AB) =
1
M
M∑
m=1
hˆ(AB)(m) = α¯(I)h(AB)+
√
1− α¯(I)2w¯+w¯(I) ,
(3)
where α¯(I) , w¯ and w¯(I) represent the average value of the
time-varying fading and noise vectors, respectively. h¯(AB) can
be used as a reference to classify new estimates coming from
unknown sources.
b) Phase II (classification): After the training phase has
been completed, Bob receives further packets without assur-
ance that they come from Alice. Bob estimates the channel
through which these new packets arrive, and exploits such
an estimate to decide whether they come from Alice or not.
This is done by comparing any of these estimates with the
reference one obtained during the training phase. As done in
[9], we suppose that in this phase Eve can forge packets on
which Bob’s estimate is forced to be equal to a vector g (plus
noise).
In order for Bob to decide if a packet comes from Alice
or from Eve during the classification phase, we consider and
compare two approaches:
• classical statistical methods based on hypothesis testing;
• modern techniques based on machine learning.
When Bob resorts to statistical methods, it is convenient
for him to use the average estimate in (3) as a benchmark,
while when machine learning-based decision criteria are used
he can exploit the whole training set deriving from the M
channel estimates. The two approaches are described next.
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Fig. 2. Confusion matrix.
A. Performance metrics
The performances achievable through the considered ap-
proaches are evaluated by measuring their probability of false
alarm (FA) and of missed detection (MD). By false alarm
we mean the event that occurs when Bob rejects a message
coming from Alice, while there is a missed detection when
he accepts a message forged by Eve. If we take a measure
to reduce the probability of FA, normally this increases the
probability of MD. Therefore, a trade-off between these two
effects has to be found.
It is important to observe that while time-varying fading
negatively affects the correct authentication of legitimate sig-
nals, it plays a positive role from the attacker’s point of view.
In fact, as will be shown in the following, it directly influences
the probability of FA, forcing Bob to accept a larger range of
inputs, and thus increasing the chances for Eve that one of her
forged messages is accepted as authentic.
As regards the statistical methods, analytical formulations
of the two mentioned probabilities can be found and depend
on the type of test performed.
Probabilities of FA and MD resulting from the application
of machine learning algorithms can instead be evaluated by
exploiting the so-called Confusion Matrix, shown in Fig. 2.
The confusion matrix provides a comprehensive overview of
classification results. Columns represent the predicted values,
while rows represent the actual values. It contains 4 kinds of
entries, the true positives, the false positives, the true negatives
and the false negatives. The total number of samples in the
test data corresponds to the sum of these entries.
False positives (FP) represent samples coming from Eve
incorrectly classified as positives, i.e. considered as authentic
by Bob. This event corresponds to a MD. A large number of
FPs can be due to a noisy training set and to the impact of
fading in Phase I. If we define the number of negative samples
classified as negative (or true negatives) as TN, the probability
of MD of a classifier can be written as
PMD =
FP
FP + TN
= 1− TNR, (4)
where TNR = TN
TN+FP represents the true negative rate.
False negatives (FN) are instead messages coming from
Alice refused by Bob (positive samples classified as negative).
This event corresponds to a FA. If we denote as TP the number
4of true positives (positive samples classified as positive), the
probability of FA corresponds to
PFA =
FN
TP + FN
= 1− TPR, (5)
where TPR = TP
TP+FN represents the true negative rate.
Another common metric used to evaluate the performance
of a classification algorithm is the accuracy. It is defined as
the ratio between the number of correct predictions and the
total number of instances classified or, in formulas
ACC =
TP + TN
TP + FP + TN + FN
. (6)
Accuracy and other widespread performance metrics of
supervised classification, however, are not always suitable for
the OCC scenario, since negative data have a highly skewed
distribution with regard to the target data, and could lead to
misleading values. To overcome this issue, we resort to the
Geometric Mean (gmean) of accuracy (introduced in [23]),
measured separately on each class; by combining the true
positive rate (TPR) and the true negative rate (TNR), it is
defined as
gmean =
√
TPR · TNR =
√
(1− PFA)(1 − PMD). (7)
An important property of gmean is that it is independent
of the distribution of positive and negative samples in the
test data. This allows assessing the classifier performance not
only on the basis of the predominant class (as happens for the
accuracy), but on both classes.
III. STATISTICAL METHODS
According to classical statistical decision methods, Bob
resorts to hypothesis testing [24] to decide whether the trans-
mission was performed by Alice or not. Denoting by hˆ the
channel estimated by Bob, the two hypotheses are
• H0: the message is coming from Alice. The new mea-
sured channel estimate is subject to time-varying fading
and its correlation with the reference estimates collected
during Phase I depends on how severely the fading affects
the channel. The hypothesis H0 at time t can therefore
be written as
hˆ(t) = α(II)(t)h(AB) +
√
1−α(II)2(t)wF +w(II)(t),
(8)
where the noise vector is written as w(II) ∼
CN (0N×1, σ2IIIN ). In order to distinguish between the
impact of time-varying fading in Phase I and Phase II, in
this second case it is represented by means of the vector
α
(II) and of a random variable wF .
• H1: the message is coming from Eve, and
hˆ(t) = g +w(II)(t). (9)
Two different statistical criteria for Bob to decide between
the two hypotheses H0 and H1 are considered next. The per-
formance achievable through these tests is then evaluated by
measuring their probability of FA and of MD. By false alarm
we mean the event that occurs when Bob rejects a message
coming from Alice, while there is a missed detection when
he accepts a message forged by Eve. If we take a measure
to reduce the probability of FA, normally this increases the
probability of MD. Therefore, a trade-off between these two
effects has to be found.
It is important to observe that while time-varying fading
negatively affects the correct authentication of legitimate sig-
nals, it plays a positive role from the attacker’s point of view.
In fact, as will be shown in the following, it directly influences
the probability of FA, forcing Bob to accept a larger range of
inputs, and thus increasing the chances for Eve that one of her
forged messages is accepted as authentic.
A. Logarithm of likelihood ratio test
Let us first consider the generalized likelihood ratio test
(GLRT) [24], as done in [9], where flat fading channels were
considered and g is replaced by its maximum likelihood (ML)
estimate. We take into account the more general case in which
channel variations occur during the authentication.
The logarithm of the likelihood ratio (LLR) of a channel
estimate hˆ over its N components can be written as [9]:
Ψ ∝ 2
N∑
n=1
1
σ2n
∣∣∣hˆn − h¯(AB)n ∣∣∣2, (10)
where σ2n represents the per-dimension variance, evaluated as
σ2n = σ
2
I + σ
2
II +
√
1− α¯(I)2n +
√
1− α(II)2n .
By substituting (8) in (10), we obtain that under the hypoth-
esis H0, Ψ is a non-central chi-square random variable as in
[9], with non centrality parameter
µ =
N∑
n=1
2
σ2n
∣∣∣(α(II)n − α¯(I)n )h(AB)n ∣∣∣2 . (11)
We note that µ is strictly dependent on α¯(I) , and becomes zero
in the limit case of α¯(I)n = α
(II)
n = 1 on each channel (absence
of fading during both phases), which boils down to the case
considered in [9].
The GLRT consists in comparing the LLR with a threshold
θ > 0, i.e. {
Ψ ≤ θ : decide for H0,
Ψ > θ : decide for H1.
(12)
We can evaluate the probability of FA PFA , i.e., the proba-
bility that Bob refuses a message coming from Alice, as
PFA = P [Ψ > θ|H0] = 1− Fχ2,µ(θ), (13)
where Fχ2,µ(·) denotes the cumulative density function (c.d.f.)
of a chi-square random variable with 2N degrees of freedom
and noncentrality parameter µ.
By substituting the hypothesis H1 in the LLR expression
(10), we note that Ψ is again a non-central chi-square random
variable, but the noncentrality parameter in this case is given
by
β =
N∑
n=1
2
σ2n
∣∣∣gn − α¯(I)n h(AB)n ∣∣∣2 . (14)
We can then calculate the probability of MD as
PMD = P [Ψ ≤ θ|H1] = Fχ2,β(θ). (15)
5By imposing a target PFA , the threshold is set as
θ = F−1
χ2,µ
(1− PFA). (16)
In the case we consider, in which fading can also affect the
training phase, the authentication performance is always worse
than in the case without fading during the training phase. In
fact, according to the properties of the non-central chi-squared
distribution, the presence of fading (measured by means of the
parameter α(I) ) leads to an increase of both the non-centrality
parameters µ and β with respect to their corresponding values
in absence of time-varying fading. As a consequence, given
the same PFA , also the value of the threshold θ increases, with
an inevitable worsening of the probability of MD. This is also
proved by the numerical results shown in Sec. VIB.
B. Bound on test performance
Let us suppose that in Phase 1 Bob is able to collect
messages that surely come from Eve, and thus are in the form
hˆ(E) = g +w(I) . (17)
In this case we do not need to substitute Eve’s forged vector
g with its ML estimate, since Bob knows it exactly except
for the presence of AWGN noise. Therefore the GLRT metric
takes the form
Ψ¯ = ln
f
hˆ|H1
(hˆ)
f
hˆ|H0
(hˆ)
, (18)
where f(hˆ|·)(hˆ) represents the probability density function
(p.d.f.) of hˆ under hypothesis H1 at the numerator and under
hypothesis H0 at the denominator.
Considering that under hypothesis H0 hˆ is Gaussian dis-
tributed around hˆ(AB) with per-dimension variance σ2, while
under hypothesis H1 is Gaussian distributed around hˆ(E) with
per-dimension variance σ2E (the value of the variance depends
on how Eve forges g, which will be described in Section IV),
eq. (18) on the n-th sub-carrier can be written as
Ψ¯ = N ln
σ
σE
+
1
2σ2
N∑
n=1
|hˆn − h¯(AB)n |2−
1
2σ2E
N∑
n=1
|hˆn − hˆ(E)n |2.
(19)
The GLRT then exploits the following decision criterion:{
Ψ¯ ≤ θ¯ : decide for H0,
Ψ¯ > θ¯ : decide for H1,
(20)
where θ¯ represents the minimum value of the threshold needed
to achieve a given probability of false alarm.
Differently from (13) and (15), no closed form expression
is available for PFA and PMD in this case and they are
estimated through Montecarlo simulations. The probabilities
of FA and MD achievable represent a lower bound on the test
performance that we can obtain when using the LLR test and
will be used as a benchmark in some examples presented in
Section VI.
C. Combined test
As it results from our numerical simulations, reported in
Section VI, the LLR test alone however is not sufficient to
guarantee a correct authentication (and a small probability of
MD) for values of α(II) that are not next to 1. In order to
address this issue and improve performance, we also consider a
slightly modified decision strategy for Bob, based on a double
verification. For this purpose, let us consider that Bob still
exploits the LLR test, but followed by a modulus comparison,
to decide whether a message is coming from Alice or Eve.
The additional test based on the modulus is performed by
comparing the modulus of the reference estimate h¯(AB) and
the current estimate hˆ. Thus we define
Γ =
N∑
n=1
(∣∣∣h¯(AB)n ∣∣∣− ∣∣∣hˆn∣∣∣) . (21)
Using such a simple modulus comparison alone results in
a poor performance. However, we consider that Bob uses
both the criterion based on the LLR and that based on the
modulus: only if both these conditions are met, then Bob
accepts the message as authentic. The verification condition
can be therefore written as{
Φ ≤ θ,−ǫ ≤ Γ ≤ ǫ : decide for H0,
else : decide for H1,
(22)
where ǫ is a sufficiently small threshold. In the ideal case
of absence of noise and fading during the training phase, ǫ
should be equal to zero. Since we are considering a realistic
scenario affected by both noise and fading, we must allow ǫ to
be greater than zero in order to allow Bob to accept messages
coming from Alice.
The probability of false alarm can be therefore defined as
the probability that at least one of the two conditions is not
verified when the sender is Alice (hypothesis H0), i.e.
PFA = 1− P [Ψ ≤ θ,−ǫ ≤ Γ ≤ ǫ|H0] , (23)
while the probability of missed detection can be written as
PMD = P [Ψ ≤ θ,−ǫ ≤ Γ ≤ ǫ|H1] . (24)
Being Γ computed as the difference of the modulus of
two complex normal random variables, which follow an Hoyt
distribution [25], its c.d.f. can be evaluated according to [26,
eq. (8)]. However, a closed form expression for the joint
probability distribution of Ψ and Γ is not known, thus for
its estimation we resort to Monte Carlo simulations.
1) Thresholds optimization: In order to find the optimal
values θ∗ and ǫ∗ of the thresholds θ and ǫ, we look for their
joint values which minimize the probability of MD, i.e.
(θ∗, ǫ∗) = argmin
θ,ǫ
P [Ψ ≤ θ,−ǫ ≤ Γ ≤ ǫ|H1] , (25)
under the constraint of a fixed PFA .
We exploit a two-steps optimization procedure, which com-
putes the couples (θ, ǫ) that satisfy the constraint imposed on
PFA and then select the one that gives the minimum PMD .
6IV. ATTACKER MODEL
Eve aims at performing a tailored attack based on Bob’s
decision strategy. We suppose that she has partial CSI, that
is, she knows the statistics of all transmission channels, but
not the exact channel realizations. We assume that Eve can
observe transmissions from Alice to Bob and vice versa, thus
estimating h(AE) and h(EB). We denote the m-th channel
estimates obtained by Eve as
hˆ(AE)(m) = ρAEh
(AB) +
√
1− ρ2AEr(m) +w(AE)(m),
(26)
hˆ(EB)(m) = ρEBh
(AB) +
√
1− ρ2EBr(m) +w(EB)(m), (27)
where w(AE) ∼ CN (0N×1, σ2AE IN ) and w(EB) ∼
CN (0N×1, σ2EBIN ) represent the noise vectors and r is a
complex normal random vector with unitary variance. The
coefficient ρXY ∈ [0; 1] denotes the spatial correlation between
two channels linking a generic node Z to two distinct nodes
X and Y .
Opposed to the correlation of several realizations of the
same channel in time, we denote this correlation as spatial
correlation of two different channels at some fixed time.
Eve’s attack is supposed to be based on the average of the
estimates collected in Phase 1, since Bob relies on this for the
subsequent authentication phase. This is opposed to a differen-
tial authentication approach [27], in which Bob progressively
updates its reference estimate. The latter, however, is suitable
in the case of correlated fading over time, which is not the
case we consider. As a consequence, the time coefficient vector
α
(II)(t) in Phase 2 does not affect her forged vector g.
A. Attack to the LLR test
When Bob uses the LLR test, Eve’s best attack strategy
is represented by the ML estimate of hˆ(AB) based on her
observations hˆ(AE) and hˆ(EB). According to [9, eq. (45)], the
components of the forged vector g can be written as
gn = hˆ
(EB)
n Cn + hˆ
(AE)
n Dn, (28)
with Cn and Dn defined as
Cn =
ρEBω
(EB)
n − ρABρAE
ω
(AE)
n ω
(EB)
n − ρ2AB
, (29a)
Dn =
ρAEω
(AE)
n − ρABρEB
ω
(AE)
n ω
(EB)
n − ρ2AB
, (29b)
where ω
(AE)
n = 1+
σ2AE
λn
, ω
(EB)
n = 1+
σ2EB
λn
and λn is the power
delay. According to the previous definition, ρAB represents the
spatial correlation between the two channels observed by Eve,
i.e. the Alice-Eve channel and the Eve-Bob one.
As already done by Bob, if Eve can retrieve M > 1
observations of h(AE) and h(EB), she can try to refine her
attack by averaging over them in order to reduce the noise
level.
B. Attack to the combined test
In order to find the optimal attack strategy for Eve when
Bob uses the combined test described in Section III-C, denoted
as modulus attack for brevity, we consider the worst case
scenario, where Eve is able to perfectly estimate h(AE) and
h(EB) , i.e. σ2AE = σ
2
EB = 0. For sake of simplicity we also
suppose that no correlation exists between the two channels
observed by her or, in other words, ρAB → 0.
Under these hypotheses (28) boils down to
gn = ρAEhˆAE + ρEBhˆEB. (30)
On the other hand, in order to make |g| more similar to∣∣∣hˆ(AB)∣∣∣, in the modulus attack Eve can choose
gn =
hˆ
(AE)
n
ρAE
+
hˆ
(EB)
n
ρEB
, for ρAE, ρEB 6= 0. (31)
When we consider a decision strategy based on both LLR
and modulus comparison, however, attacks based on (30) and
(31) are no longer optimal. In this case, the best attack strategy
in fact consists in forging
gn = ρ
x
AEhˆ
(AE)
n + ρ
y
EBhˆ
(EB)
n , (32)
where x, y ∈ [−1, 1]. This requires finding a trade-off between
the modulus attack and the LLR attack. In fact, x = y = −1
corresponds to the best attack to the modulus comparison
method, while x = y = 1 corresponds to the best attack
strategy to the LLR. Finding the optimal values of the couple
(x, y) corresponds to solve the problem
(x, y) = arg max
x,y∈[−1,1]
P
[
Ψ(x) ≤ θ,Γ(x)2 ≤ ǫ2|g = (32)] ,
(33)
i.e. to find the values of (x, y) that give the highest probability
of missed detection. In Table I we report the optimal values
of (x, y) obtained by solving (33) through numerical methods,
with PFA = 10
-4 and different values of sub-carriers N and
the time-varying fading α(II) , considering the absence of time-
varying fading in Phase 1 (α(I) = 1).
We observe that for high values of the spatial correlation the
attack to the LLR test results to be most convenient strategy
to adopt for Eve even when Bob chooses the combined test.
The case with ρAE = 1 is of special interest: Eve is exactly is
Alice’s same position, so each kind of attack results successful
independently of the choice of (x, y).
Since the attacker does not know exactly the values of α(II) ,
her most conservative choice is to suppose that all the entries
of α(II) are equal to 1. In fact, Eve is in the worst condition
in absence of fading, since Bob lets fewer messages to be
accepted as authentic.
C. Mismatched Attacker
Let us consider an attacker who does not exactly know
which is the decision criterion used by Bob. In such a case,
Eve has no option but to try to design g such as it gives the
best probability of missed detection in each case. In particular,
Eve’s problem here is to decide a general strategy which
7TABLE I
OPTIMAL VALUES OF THE EXPONENTS (x, y) IN EQ. 32 FOR DIFFERENT VALUES OF α(II) ANDN , WITH α(I) = 1 AND ρAE = ρEB = ρ.
α
(II) N
ρ
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
1
1 (0.7, 0.7) (0.8, 0.8) (0.9, 1) (1, 1) (1, 1) (1, 1) (1, 1) (1, 1) (1, 1) (1, 1)
3 (0.7, 0.7) (0.8, 0.9) (1, 1) (1, 1) (1, 1) (1, 1) (1, 1) (1, 1) (1, 1) (1, 1)
6 (0.8, 0.6) (0.9, 0.9) (1, 1) (1, 1) (1, 1) (1, 1) (1, 1) (1, 1) (1, 1) (1, 1)
0.8
1 (0.4, 0.5) (0.5, 0.6) (0.6, 0.6) (0.7, 0.6) (0.8, 0.8) (0.9, 1) (1, 1) (1, 1) (1, 1) (1, 1)
3 (0.4, 0.5) (0.5, 0.6) (0.6, 0.6) (0.8, 0.6) (0.8, 0.8) (1, 1) (1, 1) (1, 1) (1, 1) (1, 1)
6 (0.5, 0.3) (0.6, 0.4) (0.5, 0.6) (0.7, 0.6) (0.7, 0.8) (0.9, 0.9) (1, 1) (1, 1) (1, 1) (1, 1)
leads to the highest possible probability of missed detection
whatever is the decision method adopted by Bob.
In Figs. 3a and 3b we compare the average probability of
missed detection obtained when Eve’s attack strategy follows
(30), (31) and (32) with the values of (x, y) found in Table I
for ρAE = ρEB = 0.1 and α
(II) = [0.8, 1] on each sub-carrier.
It is possible to note that using the wrong attack strategy is
penalizing especially when Bob exploits a combined test and
when α(II) < 1, and this is particularly evident for a large
number of sub-carriers N . In case of stationary channels,
i.e. α(II) = 1, performances are almost equivalent for both
decision strategies.
V. METHODS BASED ON MACHINE LEARNING
Let us now consider the application of machine learning
techniques to the authentication protocol presented in Section
II. These methods have the advantage of not requiring any
knowledge about the CSI on the receiver’s side, not even
the per-dimension variance σ2 needed by the statistical tests
illustrated in Sec. III. They are hence able to perform authen-
tication in a blind way.
We consider both a realistic scenario where the authenticator
is able to collect only samples belonging to the legitimate
transmitter during Phase I and the ideal case in which Bob
is aware of the presence of Eve and knows some information
about her. In the latter case Phase I corresponds to the training
phase of a binary classifier, while in the former one we must
consider one class classification (OCC), where only one class
(referred to as positive class or target class) is present and the
others (negative classes or non-target classes) are not known.
In other words, the training set of an OCC algorithm contains
only samples from the target class, while for the other classes
there are no instances (or they are very few or do not form
a statistically-representative sample of the negative concept)
[28].
The main purpose of OCC is to define decision limits around
the target class, in order to classify new instances (or, in our
case, new messages) as internal or external. In the case of a
sample classified as external or outlier, this is not associated
to a specific class, but is just identified as not belonging to
the positive class (and therefore as a member of the negative
class). The goal of OCC is then more complex with respect to
traditional binary or multi-class classification, with particular
regard to the definition of decision parameters and features
to use in order to better distinguish positive and negative
instances.
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Fig. 3. Performance of the matched versus mismatched attacker in terms of
average PMD , when Bob applies the a) LLR test and b) combined test, with
α
(I) = 1, ρAE = ρEB = 0.1.
OCC methods are mainly based on two parameters [29]: the
distance d(x) between the sample to classify and the target
class (i.e. the training set X), and the threshold θd on the
value of the distance. Formally, a new instance is recognized
as belonging to the positive class if its distance from the target
class is below the threshold. In formulas
f(x) = I (d(x) < θd) (34)
8where I(·) represents an indicator function1 and f(x) is
the binary function expressing acceptance of the object x
into the target class. There are several metrics which can
be used to evaluate d(x). The most common choice is the
Euclidean distance. Consider an arbitrary instance x described
by the feature vector {a1(x), a2(x), ..., aN (x)}, where ar(x)
represents the value of the r-th attribute of instance x. Then
the distance between x and a generic instance xi is defined as
d(x) ≡
√√√√ N∑
r=1
(ar(x)− ar(xi))2 (35)
OCC approaches differ in the evaluation of the distance
and in the optimization of the threshold, on the basis of
the available training set. Many different methods have been
proposed [28], starting from their multi-class version. In the
following, we consider two different algorithms, i.e. the one
class nearest neighbor (OCNN) technique and the SVMs.
A. Nearest Neighbors
NN algorithms classify a sample x by assigning it the most
frequent label among its k nearest neighbors. What makes NN
algorithms particularly suitable for an authentication scheme
to be implemented in resource-constrained devices is their
low complexity. They operate classification only on instances
of the training set and not on statistical assumptions. The
training phase and the training set update are straightforward,
being based only on the memorization of the training set,
although their complexity grows with its dimension. Since
in authentication schemes it is reasonable to assume that
phase I is short and Bob receives a limited number of setup
packets, it is also reasonable to assume to work with a small
training set, thus making the choice of classification based
on NN algorithms a good trade-off between complexity and
performance.
OCNN techniques are derived from traditional binary NN
algorithms. The main idea underlying these classification
methods is to compare the distance between the test sample
and the target class with a distance computed within samples
already belonging to the target class. Trivially, if the first
distance is similar to the second one (on the basis of some
threshold), then the test sample can be classified as positive.
OCNN algorithms compute the second distance based on the
local neighborhood of the test sample.
In detail, a OCNN algorithm works as follows [30]: it finds
the j nearest neighbors {y1, · · · , yj} of the test sample x in
the target class, and the k nearest neighbors {zi1, · · · , zik}
of the first j neighbors; it evaluates the average dis-
tance D¯xy over
{
Dxy1, · · · , Dxyj
}
and the average distance
D¯yz over {Dy1z11 , · · · , Dy1z1k , · · · , Dy1zk1 , · · · , Dykzkk}; x
is then considered as a member of the target class if
D¯xy
D¯yz
< θd, (36)
1An indicator function is a function defined on a set X that indicates
membership of an element in a subset A of X. Its value is 1 for all elements
of A and 0 for all elements of X not in A.
where θd is a suitably chosen decision threshold. OCNN
methods can be grouped into four main categories (11NN,
1KNN, J1NN, JKNN), depending on which of the parameters
j and k is fixed to 1. They differ in the number of nearest
neighbors used to compute the decision threshold [30].
B. Support Vector Machines
Despite their low complexity, NN algorithms require to
determine some optimal parameters, such as j, k and θd,
which can become computationally expensive. For this reason,
we also consider a second kind of classifiers, known as
SVM classifiers. In general, SVMs can create a non-linear
decision boundary to separate different classes by projecting
the data through a non-linear function to a space with a higher
dimension, lifting them from their original space to a feature
space, which can be of unlimited dimension.
Their one-class version, also known as single-class classifi-
cation or novelty detection, was introduced in [31]. The main
concept behind the OC-SVM algorithm consists in obtaining
a spherical boundary, in feature space, around the data. The
volume of this hyper sphere is minimized, to minimize the
effect of incorporating outliers in the solution [32]. This
property is visually displayed with a two-dimensional example
in Figs. 4a and 4b, where boundaries, or learned frontiers,
obtained for two different values of ρAE are highlighted, with
a training set of 100 samples, two features selected (corre-
sponding to a real and imaginary part of channel coefficient
on a single sub-carrier) and in absence of time-varying fading,
i.e. α(I) = α(II) = 1.
In particular, the OC-SVM has the goal to estimate a
function foc(x) that encloses the most of training data into
a hyper sphere Rx =
{
x ∈ RN |foc(x) > 0
}
, where N is the
size of feature vector. foc(x) is the decision function, and is
written as
foc(x) = sgn
{
m∑
i=1
λiK(x, xi)− ξ
}
, (37)
where m represents the number of training samples, ξ is
the distance of the hyper sphere from the origin and K(·, ·)
defines the OC-SVM kernel that allows projecting data from
the original space to the feature space. λi are the Lagrange
multipliers computed by optimizing the following equations
min
λ

12
∑
i,j
λiλjK(xi, xj)

 , (38)
subject to
0 ≤ λi ≤ 1
νm
, (39)
m∑
i=1
λi = 1, (40)
where ν is the percentage of data considered as outliers.
Modifying the parameter ν allows to optimize the value of
gmean or to minimize one of the two probabilities of FA and
MD.
9−0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0
Feature 1 
−1.0
−0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
Fe
at
ur
e 
2 
Novelty Detection
learned frontier
training packets
packets from Alice
packets from Eve
(a)
−1.5 −1.0 −0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0
Feature 1 
−1.5
−1.0
−0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
Fe
at
ur
e 
2 
Novelty Detection
learned frontier
training packets
packets from Alice
packets from Eve
(b)
Fig. 4. Boundary obtained by OC-SVM choosing N = 1, α(I) = α(I) = 1, M = 100, with (a) ρAE = 0.1 and (b) ρAE = 0.8.
A pattern x is then accepted when foc(x) > 0. Otherwise,
it is rejected. Different functions can be used, such as linear,
polynomial or Gaussian kernels. Usually, the Gaussian is the
most used kernel, which allows determining the radius of the
hyper sphere according the parameter 1/2σ2SVM . It is defined
as
K(x, xi) = exp
(
−||x− xi||
2
2σ2SVM
)
. (41)
where the numerator represents the squared Euclidean distance
between two general feature vectors, while σSVM is a free
parameter.
C. Clustering
All previous classification mechanisms require that Bob
exactly knows the source of one or more packets during the
training phase. This assumption requires the use of higher
layer cryptographic protocols or manual solutions, which may
result unpractical in some cases. To address this issue, we
also consider the use of clustering algorithms [33] for Bob
to establish the origin of packets during the training phase
and to assign them a possibly correct label. In particular, we
focus on the k-means approach [34], which guarantees good
performance and fast convergence.
Given a set of m instances (x1, x2, · · · , xm), the goal of
k-means clustering is to partition them into k ≤ m sets
(or clusters) S = {S1, S2, · · · , Sk} such as to minimize the
within-cluster sum of squares (WCSS). More formally, the
objective is to find
argmin
S
k∑
i=1
∑
x∈Si
‖x− µi‖2, (42)
where µi represents the mean of points in Si. Classes labels
in the training phase will be therefore determined by results
got from the algorithm and not assigned a priori by the
authenticator.
VI. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In this section, we assess and compare the performance
of statistical and machine learning-based decision methods
under different system conditions and assumptions. For the
sake of simplicity, and without loss of generality, we consider
examples in which time-varying fading affects all channels in
the same way during both authentication phases, i.e. αn = α
for n = 1, · · · , N . We also suppose that Eve can estimate
the channel between Alice and herself, but not the channel
between her and Bob. Bob in fact receives messages from
Alice but is not expected to transmit enough messages to
allow the attacker to extract useful information on h(EB), thus
imposing ρAB → 0, ρEB → 0, ρAE > 0. Moreover, we assume
to give Eve the maximum advantage, allowing her to perfectly
estimate h(AE) , i.e. considering σ2AE = 0. The average signal
to noise ratio (SNR) on channel estimates during both phases
is SNR(I) = 1/σ2I and SNR
(II) = 1/σ2II .
We compare the performance of statistical and machine
learning-based decision methods by giving them the same
inputs. For this purpose, the features we use for machine
learning are represented by the real and the imaginary parts of
the channel coefficient measured on each sub-carrier for both
NN and SVM algorithms. Therefore the number of features
corresponds to 2N .
A. Parameter setting and OCC performance evaluation
We first examine the security performance achievable by
OCC techniques. As already said in Sec. V, NN methods
require the definition and optimization of the parameters j, k
and θd, and we use a g-fold cross validation to optimize them
in order to obtain the best possible gmean. As an example, the
results obtained for α(I) = α(II) = 1 and N = 3 are reported in
Tab. II, choosing g equal to 5 and considering two training sets
of 100 and 1000 samples (with 50% of samples belonging to
the positive class and 50% to the negative class for the k-NN).
OCNN algorithms have been implemented in Matlab 2019a.
The presented case studies were run on a machine equipped
with an Intel Core i7-8565U 3.9 Ghz Quad-core processore
10
and 16 GB of RAM. The number of features seems to have
an almost irrelevant impact on the computational times, as
shown in Fig. 5. We note that, as predictable, JKNN requires
a larger time than the other methods, especially compared to
11NN, which needs only a threshold optimization.
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Fig. 5. Training times required for different NN algorithms with ρAE , α
(I) =
0.8, α(II) = 0.9, SNR(I) = 15dB, SNR(II) = 20dB and M = 100 (training
set dimension).
TABLE II
OPTIMIZED PARAMETERS FOR NN METHODS, WITH α(I) = α(II) = 1 AND
N = 3, CONSIDERING TWO TRAINING SETS OF 100 AND 1000 SAMPLES
(INTO BRACKETS).
KNN 11NN 1KNN J1NN JKNN
ρAE = 0.1
k 9 (31) - 3 (3) - 2 (2)
j - - - 2 (2.5) 2 (2)
θd - 3 (3.5) 2.5 (3) 3 (3.5) 2.5 (2.5)
ρAE = 0.8
k 3 (7) - 5 (27) - 6 (22)
j - - - 7 (25) 6 (22)
θd - 2 (2) 1.5 (1) 2 (2.5) 2 (1.5)
Regarding SVM algorithms, we exploit a modified version
of the tool in [35]. We use a Gaussian kernel, which proved
to be more effective than linear and polynomial kernels in our
scenario, as it is evident from the results reported in Table
III. Results achieved by applying different OCC algorithms
to the same data set are then compared, in terms of gmean,
probabilities of MD and FA. In the following examples, we
consider SNR(I) = 15dB and SNR(II) = 20dB, fading
coefficients α(I) = 1 and α(II) = 0.9, a training set of
M = 100 samples and a classification set composed by 5
subsets of 4 · 105 elements. Each subset contains 50% of
positive samples and 50% of negative samples. The values
of PMD and PFA are averaged over 100 different datasets
randomly generated.
In Fig. 6 the performance obtained for different values
of the spatial correlation coefficient ρAE is shown, with the
meaning of Eve being at decreasing distances from Bob, while
in Fig. 7a results are obtained for different numbers of sub-
carriers. We can note that, in general, there is no OCNN
algorithm that results to be the best one for any value of
ρAE . However, for a given similar performance, 11NN requires
TABLE III
RESULTS OBTAINED BY SVM WITH DIFFERENT KERNELS, WITH
M = 100, ρAE = 0.8, α
(I) = α(II) = 1 AND A DATASET DIMENSION
EQUAL TO 1000.
N 1 2 3 4 5 6
Gaussian
PFA 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001
PMD 0.08 0.024 0.05 0.01 0.001 < 0.001
Poly
PFA 0.019 0.007 0.022 0.002 0.03 0.005
PMD 0.119 0.064 0.058 0.04 0.02 0.017
Linear
PFA 0.019 0.007 0.02 0.002 0.029 0.005
PMD 0.118 0.064 0.058 0.04 0.02 0.017
much smaller training and classification times, especially in
comparison with JKNN. Under the considered assumptions,
SVM seems to obtain the lowest probability of MD, but at
the expenses of a higher FA. By looking at the curves it is
possible to observe that until ρAE ≤ 0.4 all the algorithms
exhibit a MD probability lower than 10−6, meaning that no
MD event has been observed over the entire classification set,
of dimension 106. Moreover, as expected, Fig. 7a testify the
fact that an increasing number of features is beneficial from a
security point of view. In addition, Fig. 7b displays the optimal
values of gmean for increasing values of N , showing that NN
algorithms are able to achieve a better gmean than SVMs, and
thus a better balance between the values of PFA and PMD (see
Eq. (7)). Accuracy exhibits less sensitivity to the number of
features with respect to gmean.
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Fig. 6. Probability of MD as a function of the spatial correlation ρAE ,
comparing NN and SVM algorithms, with α(I) = 1, α(II) = 0.9, N = 3,
SNR(I) = 15dB, SNR(II) = 20dB and M = 100 (training set dimension).
B. Impact of the training phase
The training phase, or Phase I, has clearly a relevant
impact on the subsequent classification phase performance.
Let us assess how different training parameters and conditions
influence the system performance.
First of all, reliability of the training set must be taken into
account. In the ideal case, the labels of instances forming
the training set are exactly known. In real cases, instead,
they may be unknown, and must be hence inferred through
clustering techniques. A comparison of these two cases in
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Fig. 7. a) Probabilities of FA and MD and b) gMEAN and ACC as function of
the number of sub-carriers N , comparing 11NN and SVM algorithms, with
α(I) = 1 and α(II) = 0.9, ρAE = 0.8, SNR
(I) = 15dB, SNR(II) = 20dB
and M = 100.
terms of probability of MD is illustrated in Fig. 8, where a
training procedure based on clustering is compared with one in
which instance labels are exactly known. In both cases, a two-
class SVM algorithm with Gaussian kernel has been applied
over a training set of 200 samples composed by 100 samples
from Alice and 100 from Eve. Despite being disadvantaged,
clustering methods are able to achieve the same performance
of methods with assigned labels for low values of ρAE but, as
expected, they achieve larger PMD as soon as ρAE increases.
The probability of FA remains fixed and lower than 10−6,
except for ρAE = 1.
In Tab. IV we compare the results obtained with training
sets of different dimension by using a 11NN algorithm (chosen
among the other OCNN methods thanks to its low complexity
which makes it able to train a set of dimension 10,000 in
reasonable times) and a SVM algorithm. In both cases, we
observe that the value of M has a small impact on the results,
and the only relevant improvement is given on the PFA of the
SVM for α(II) = 1 . This implies that we can use a small
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
AE
10-6
10-5
10-4
10-3
10-2
10-1
100
E[
P M
D
]
Assigned labels
Clustering
Fig. 8. Average probability of MD versus ρAE using clustering with respect
to known instance labels, with N = 6, M = 200, α(I) = α(II) = 1,
SNR(I) = 15dB, SNR(II) = 20dB, classification performed using a SVM.
TABLE IV
RESULTS FOR DIFFERENT TRAINING SET DIMENSIONS CHOOSINGN = 3,
ρAE = 0.8 AND α
(I) = 1.
dim 10 100 1,000 10,000
α(II) = 1
SVM
PFA 7.4 · 10
−3 1.93 · 10−4 4 · 10−6 4 · 10−6
PMD 3.45 · 10
−3 7.07 · 10−3 6.47 · 10−3 5.73 · 10−3
11NN
PFA 3.39 · 10
−3 6.36 · 10−3 0.055 0.03
PFA 0.093 0.159 0.085 0.099
α(II) = 0.8
SVM
PMD 0.994 0.991 0.992 0.992
PMD 3.45 · 10
−3 7.07 · 10−4 6.47 · 10−3 5.73 · 10−3
11NN
PFA 0.880 0.890 0.904 0.907
PMD 0.130 0.128 0.114 0.101
training set without incurring in any significant performance
degradation.
In Figs. 9a and 9b it is shown how much the SNR (and
thus the noise variance) in Phase I affects the performance
of the protocol. In Fig. 9a we report the results obtained
by statistical techniques, for a fixed probability of FA equal
to 10−4, where the occurrence of MDs increases with the
decreasing of the SNR (and the increasing of the variance).
This can be explained by considering that for low SNR Bob is
forced to accept a larger set of data in order to guarantee the
desired level of FA. Such an effect is more evident in Fig. 9b,
where probability curves resulting by the application of SVM
methods are reported and the probability of FA is not fixed.
Let us now assess the impact of the fading coefficient α
in Phase 1 on the authentication performances. In Fig. 10
we exploit a 11NN algorithm and we show that best perfor-
mances are always obtained in absence of time-varying fading
(α(I) = 1) during the training phase, outperforming even the
case where the value of the time coefficient α(I) remains the
same during both phases. Nevertheless this affects the false
alarm probability, which experiences a slight worsening. In
Fig. 11 we observe the same behavior described above for the
LLR test, where we always obtain the lowest missed detection
when considering α(I) = 1, regardless of value of α(II) .
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Fig. 9. a) Average probability of MD using a LLR test with fixed PFA =
10−4 and b) average probabilities of FA and MD using a SVM algorithm,
with N = 3, ρAE = 0.5, SNR
(II) = 20dB, α(I) = α(II) = 1.
C. Comparison of statistical and machine learning methods
In order to compare statistical and machine learning-based
methods, let us assess the performance achieved by the sta-
tistical decision criteria presented in Section III in terms of
average probability of MD. In Fig. 12 the probability of FA
has been fixed equal to 10-4 for both the examined methods,
in absence of fading in the training phase (α(I) = 1) and
with the spatial correlation coefficient ρAE set to 0.1, with
the meaning of Eve being very far from Bob’s position. As
a benchmark, we also show the curves obtained for the limit
case presented in Sec III-B, which represents a lower bound
on the performance achievable. From the results it is evident
how much the channel variability (represented by decreasing
values of α) degrades the performance of the system, with a
significant increase in the probability of MD with respect to
the flat fading case (i.e., α(II) = 1). Looking at the figure, we
note that, with respect to the single LLR test, the combined test
helps Bob to enhance the performance of the scheme, and this
becomes more evident for increasing numbers of sub-carriers.
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In addition, we observe that with α(II) = 0.8 the performance
of the LLR test is very close to the bound, but both of them
are outperformed by the combined test.
A similar assessment is reported in Fig. 13, considering
binary and one-class versions of SVM and NN algorithms
besides LLR test and its bound. The LLR test is equivalent
to a one-class statistical method, while the bound corresponds
to its binary version, since it considers the presence of Eve’s
samples in the training set. As it results from the figure, in
case of a high spatial correlation machine learning methods
exhibit an opposite behavior with respect to the LLR test with
or without availability of Eve’s samples: given almost the same
PFA , in fact, OCC based on SVM and 1KNN achieves a lower
probability of MD with respect to their binary counterparts and
the LLR test. This is probably due to the presence of negative
samples highly correlated with the positive ones in the training
set of the binary version, which “confuses” the algorithm and
leads it to misclassify new instances with a high occurrence.
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Fig. 13. Average probability of MD as function of the number of sub-
carriers N , with α(I) = α(II) = 1, ρAE = 0.8, SNR
(I) = 15dB,
SNR(II) = 20dB and M = 100, considering PFA(SVM) =[
1.39 · 10-3 , 2.12 · 10-4 , 6.85 · 10-5 , 1.68 · 10-5 , 5.55 · 10-6 , 1.62 · 10-6
]
,
PFA(1KNN) =
[
6.76 · 10-4 , 4.21 · 10-4 , < 10-6 , < 10-6 , < 10-6 , < 10-6
]
and PFA(LLR) = 10
−4 .
In Tables V and VI2 we show the performance achieved
by one-class classifiers, considering both NN and SVM algo-
rithms, and we compare them with statistical methods applied
to the same data set (for the sake of brevity we only report
the results obtained by one among the four NN classifiers),
for two different values of the spatial correlation parameter
ρAE . In order to perform a fair comparison between different
decision techniques, we choose as a target the probabilities of
FA achieved by both the considered classification algorithms
separately, and we compare the resulting probabilities of MD.
The lowest probabilities of MD for each case are highlighted
in the tables. We observe that in general with low values of
ρAE NN algorithms outperform SVM and statistical methods,
in terms of both PFA and PMD . Excellent results are achieved
2Probability less than 10−6 means that no error has been found over the
entire data set. In order to perform an analytical evaluation, these values have
been considered equal to 10−6.
especially in conditions of flat fading and with a large number
of channels. When Eve is closer to Bob however, i.e. when
the value of ρAE is large, and with α
(II) different from 1,
statistical methods (and the LLR test in particular) maintain
some advantage over the machine learning techniques. In
Tab. VI, where ρAE = 0.8, SVM algorithms achieve lower
probabilities of MD with respect to NN, although they exhibit
a higher PFA and therefore a worse balance between the two
probabilities, as already shown in Fig. 7a and through gmean
in Fig. 7b. We also note that, when the value of the spatial
correlation remains constant, we obtain the same probability
of MD for both SVM and NN algorithms, probably because
ρAE has no impact on the training phase. The same assertion
holds true as regards the probability of FA achieved by SVM
algorithms when α(II) does not vary, but interestingly not for
NN methods.
VII. CONCLUSION
We have assessed the performance achieved by different
decision techniques in a physical layer authentication scenario
with time-varying fading and in presence of an attacker. We
have considered different methods based on both statistical
criteria and machine learning algorithms. We have shown that
using a large training set that includes different realizations
of the time-varying fading is not beneficial from the security
point of view. We have also shown how clustering algorithms
can help to avoid the use of higher layer authentication
techniques in the initial phase, with only a small loss in terms
of performance when a medium-large spatial correlation with
the attacker channel exists. Somehow unexpectedly, in the
same conditions the use of binary classification algorithms
does not bring any advantage over their OCC counterparts.
Our results demonstrate that NN techniques are able to achieve
a better trade-off between the FA and MD probabilities than
the other considered classification methods. Moreover, they
always result to be the best choice with low values of the
spatial correlation, while in the other cases the application of
statistical techniques leads to better performance.
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TABLE V
AVERAGE MD AND FA PROBABILITIES OBTAINED BY DIFFERENT TEST METHODS, FOR DIFFERENT VALUES OF α(II) , WITH α(I) = 1, ρAE = 0.1,
SNR(I) = 15DB AND SNR(II) = 20DB, M = 1000.
N 1 2 3 4 5 6
α(II) = 1
PFA (1KNN) 6.76·10
-4 4.21 · 10-5 < 10-6 < 10-6 < 10-6 < 10-6
PMD (1KNN) 0.055 4.74 · 10-4 < 10-6 < 10-6 < 10-6 < 10-6
PMD (LLR) 0.255 0.094 0.044 0.012 0.0029 6.9 · 10-4
PMD (comb) 0.254 0.089 0.036 0.010 0.0019 5.5 · 10
-4
PFA (SVM) 1.39 · 10
-3 2.12 · 10-4 6.85 · 10-4 1.68 · 10−5 5.55 · 10-6 1.62 · 10-6
PMD (SVM) 0.059 2.46 · 10−3 < 10-6 < 10-6 < 10-6 < 10-6
PMD (LLR) 0.233 0.073 0.021 6.6 · 10-3 2 · 10-3 6.09 · 10-4
PMD (comb) 0.233 0.072 0.045 0.009 0.001 7.7 · 10−4
α(II) = 0.9
PFA 0.289 0.398 0.469 0.543 0.610 0.671
PMD (1KNN) 0.055 4.74 · 10
-4 < 10-6 < 10-6 < 10-6 < 10-6
PMD (LLR) 0.213 0.059 0.018 4.9 · 10−3 1.3 · 10−3 3.47 · 10-4
PMD (comb) 0.315 0.027 9.6 · 10−3 2.29 · 10−4 2.1 · 10−5 < 10-6
PFA (SVM) 0.702 0.871 0.942 0.971 0.982 0.987
PMD (SVM) 0.059 2.46 · 10
-3 < 10-6 < 10-6 < 10-6 < 10-6
PMD (LLR) 0.065 6.5 · 10
-3 6.84 · 10-4 8.06 · 10-5 1.25 · 10-5 2.35 · 10-6
PMD (comb) 0.057 1.95 · 10
−3 8.7 · 10−5 10−6 < 10−6 < 10−6
α(II) = 0.8
PFA 0.525 0.632 0.745 0.847 0.930 0.949
PMD (1KNN) 0.055 4.74 · 10
-4 < 10-6 < 10-6 < 10-6 < 10-6
PMD (LLR) 0.176 0.058 0.016 0.0037 5.78 · 10-4 1.71 · 10-4
PMD (comb) 0.228 0.011 0.0027 3.9 · 10-5 7 · 10-6 < 10-6
PFA (SVM) 0.830 0.953 0.981 0.988 0.989 0.990
PMD (SVM) 0.059 2.46 · 10-3 < 10-6 < 10-6 < 10-6 < 10-6
PMD (LLR) 0.054 4.9 · 10-3 6.75 · 10-4 5.57 · 10-5 2.05 · 10-5 < 10-6
PMD (comb) 0.043 1.07 · 10−3 5.7 · 10−5 10−6 < 10−6 < 10−6
TABLE VI
AVERAGE MD AND FA PROBABILITIES OBTAINED BY DIFFERENT TEST METHODS, FOR DIFFERENT VALUES OF α(II) , WITH α(I) = 1, ρAE = 0.8,
SNR(I) = 15DB AND SNR(II) = 20DB, M = 1000.
N 1 2 3 4 5 6
α(II) = 1
PFA 6.76 · 10
-4 4.21 · 10-5 < 10-6 < 10-6 < 10-6 < 10-6
PMD (1KNN) 0.318 0.141 0.086 0.052 0.032 0.021
PMD (LLR) 0.531 0.378 0.319 0.183 0.099 0.052
PMD (comb) 0.592 0.380 0.279 0.168 0.077 0.047
PFA (SVM) 1.39 · 10
−3 2.12 · 10−4 6.85 · 10−5 1.68 · 10−5 5.55 · 10-6 1.62 · 10-6
PMD (SVM) 0.167 0.044 0.012 2.66 · 10−3 6.83 · 10−4 1.68 · 10-4
PMD (LLR) 0.494 0.313 0.189 0.120 0.074 0.047
PMD (comb) 0.495 0.316 0.188 0.113 0.068 0.044
α(II) = 0.9
PFA (1KNN) 0.504 0.680 0.737 0.787 0.816 0.848
PMD (1KNN) 0.318 0.141 0.086 0.052 0.032 0.021
PMD (LLR) 0.243 0.080 0.037 0.016 0.008 0.004
PMD (comb) 0.363 0.167 0.092 0.055 0.035 0.021
PFA (SVM) 0.702 0.871 0.942 0.971 0.982 0.987
PMD (SVM) 0.167 0.044 0.012 2.66 · 10−3 6.83 · 10−4 1.68 · 10-4
PMD (LLR) 0.134 0.027 5.6 · 10−3 1.3 · 10−3 4.05 · 10−4 1.48 · 10-4
PMD (comb) 0.212 0.064 0.018 5.32 · 10−3 1.91 · 10−3 9.4 · 10−4
α(II) = 0.8
PFA 0.684 0.867 0.918 0.955 0.974 0.983
PMD (1KNN) 0.318 0.141 0.086 0.052 0.032 0.021
PMD (LLR) 0.196 0.052 0.021 0.007 0.003 0.001
PMD (comb) 0.319 0.124 0.073 0.040 0.023 0.016
PFA (SVM) 0.830 0.953 0.981 0.988 0.989 0.990
PMD (SVM) 0.167 0.044 0.012 2.66 · 10−3 6.83 · 10−4 1.68 · 10-4
PMD (LLR) 0.102 0.017 0.004 1.8 · 10
−3 1 · 10−3 6.84 · 10-4
PMD (comb) 0.166 0.043 0.018 9.82 · 10
−3 9.61 · 10−3 7.75 · 10−3
